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The use of accounting discretion to window dress financial statements seems to be eroding 
public confidence in the financial reporting process. Critics argue that some managers are 
intentionally abusing GAAP’s afforded discretion to manage earnings. This can reduce the 
quality of the financial reporting process and ultimately bring adverse effects on resource 
allocation in the economy. Not surprisingly, market participants, legislators, regulators, and 
academics are concerned with the need to control financial reporting abuses. In this paper we 
briefly review the recent literature on earnings management and show the incentives as well 
as the mechanics used by Lucent’s managers to manipulate earnings. We found strong 
incentives for Lucent’s managers to report smooth and increasing earnings to: a) increase the 
firm’s market capitalization; b) enhance management compensation and job security; and c) 
reduce the company’s cost of capital. The evidence we found suggests that the managers used: 
a) big bath restructuring charges; b) miscellaneous cookie jar reserves; c) premature and 
aggressive revenue recognition; and d) creative acquisition accounting and purchased R&D to 
manage earnings. 




O uso de discrição contábil para maquiar os demonstrativos financeiros parece estar 
corroendo a confiança pública no processo do relato financeiro. Os críticos argumentam que 
alguns gerentes estão intencionalmente abusando da discrição de GAAP para gerenciar lucros. 
Isto pode reduzir a qualidade do processo do relato financeiro e, finalmente, trazer efeitos 
adversos para a alocação de recursos na economia. Em função disso, os participantes do 
mercado, legisladores, reguladores e acadêmicos se preocupam com a necessidade de 
controlar os abusos do relato financeiro. Neste artigo, revisamos concisamente a literatura 
sobre o gerenciamento de lucros e mostramos tanto os incentivos, como também a mecânica, 
usados pelos gerentes da Lucent para manipular os lucros. Encontramos incentivos fortes para 
os gerentes da Lucent informarem lucros fáceis e crescentes para: 1) aumentar a capitalização 
do mercado da empresa; 2) fortalecer a compensação de gerenciamento e a garantia de 
emprego; e 3) reduzir o custo do capital da companhia. A evidência encontrada sugere que os 
gerentes, para gerenciar os lucros, usaram: 1) a estratégia de big bath para os custos de 
reestruturação; 2) reservas diversas do tipo cookie jar; 3) o reconhecimento prematuro e 
agressivo da renda; e 4) a contabilidade de aquisição criativa e o R&D adquirido.  
                                                 
1 Trabalho apresentado no XXVII ENANPAD, realizado em Curitiba/PR, no período de 25 a 29 set. 2004. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful to 
investors, creditors and others for rational decision making. The Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) are a set of principles that guide managers in preparing 
financial statements. These principles are flexible and allow managers to use their judgment 
to best report the underlying economics of their organizations. 
On some occasions, when it is unlikely that the firm will meet certain financial 
expectations (such as earnings, revenues, return on investments, debt covenants or other 
measures) and the costs of not meeting them are considered to be too high, managers may use 
GAAP's flexibility to manipulate the accounting numbers. This is also known as earnings 
management. 
Because earnings management reduces the quality of financial reporting, it can 
interfere with the resource allocation in the economy and can bring adverse consequences for 
the financial market. Enron and Worldcom are recent examples of earnings management that 
need no additional comments because of the damages they brought to the economy. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that market participants, legislators, regulators, and academics 
are concerned with the need to control financial reporting abuses. 
Responsible authorities seem to be concerned with the pervasiveness of earnings 
management. Since 1998, after Levitt's speech addressing the need to control earnings 
management, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been on the lookout for 
selective disclosure. Business Week recently published that the number of restatements more 
than tripled in the last 3 years. 
In this paper we briefly review the recent literature on earnings management and show 
the incentives as well as the mechanics used by Lucent's managers to manipulate earnings. 
We identify strong incentives for earnings management and present several suspicious 
accounting practices consistent with these incentives. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: first, we succinctly define and 
comment the earnings management definition; next, we briefly review academic literature, 
present most common incentives for earnings management and show major empirical 
findings. Subsequently, we identify possible incentives for earnings management and show 
the mechanics used by Lucent's managers to manage earnings. Finally, we present our 
conclusions and final remarks. 
 
2 WHAT IS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT? 
 
Among the many definitions of earnings management, the one most frequently cited 
is: 
 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
(HEALY; WAHLEN, 1999, P. 368). 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) observed that many aspects of this definition deserve 
additional comments. First, managers can use judgment in many different ways. For example, 
judgment is required to estimate future economic events such as salvage values of long term 
assets, obligations for pension benefits, losses from bad debt, asset impairment and many 
other events. Managers must also choose among acceptable accounting methods for reporting 
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the same economic transactions, such as straight-line or accelerated depreciation methods or 
LIFO, FIFO or weighted average inventory valuation methods. Managers must also use 
judgment to manage working capital (inventory management, timing of shipments and 
purchase of supplies and receivables policies, to name a few), which affects cost allocations 
and revenues. Managers also use judgment to make or defer expenditures such as R&D, 
advertising, and maintenance. Finally, they must also decide how to structure transactions, for 
example: lease contracts can be structured so that lease obligations are on or off balance, and 
equity investments can be structured to avoid consolidation. 
The authors also noted that the definition frames the objective of earnings 
management as misleading stakeholders about the economic performance of the firm. 
Obviously, managers can also use accounting judgment to make financial reports more 
informative for users. This can arise if certain accounting choices or estimates are perceived 
to be credible signals of a firm's financial performance. Decisions to use accounting judgment 
to make financial reports more informative for users do not fall within the definition of 
earnings management. 
Finally, the authors pointed out that management's use of judgment in financial 
reporting has both costs and benefits. The costs are potential misallocations of resources that 
arise from earnings management. Benefits include potential improvements in management's 
credible communication of private information to external stakeholders, improving resource 
allocation decisions. 
Earnings management seems to be a rather controversial matter. While the SEC and 
most academics consider it misleading to some users of financial information, some 
accountants and managers consider some alternatives of earnings management legitimate 
managerial practices.1 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) noted that it is difficult to spot earnings management 
when it occurs within the bounds of GAAP. According to them, 
  
while some financial reporting choices that clearly violate GAAP can constitute both 
fraud and earnings management, other choices, within GAAP, can constitute 
earnings management. The key point to be made is that there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between fraudulent accounting practices (that clearly demonstrate intent 
to deceive) and those judgments and estimates that fall within GAAP but may 
comprise earnings management depending on managerial intent. However, in the 
latter types of choice it would, in many cases, seem difficult, absent some objective 
evidence of intent, to distinguish earnings management from the legitimate exercise 
of accounting discretion. 
 
Therefore, not surprisingly, it is not easy to identify whether earnings management has 
occurred, and academics find it difficult to document it convincingly. A common approach 
used by them is, first, to identify conditions in which managers’ incentives to manage 
earnings are likely to be strong, and, then, to test whether patterns of unexpected accruals or 
accounting choices are consistent with these incentives. In the following section, we present 
the major academic findings. 
 
3 EVIDENCE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Healy and Whalen (1999) reviewed the academic literature on earnings management. 
They identified three major factors that could create incentives for earnings management. 
These factors are: a) capital market expectation and valuation; b) contracts written in terms of 
accounting numbers; and c) anti-trust and other government regulations. 
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3.1 Capital market motivations 
 
The widespread use of accounting information by market participants to assess firm's 
economics can generate incentives for managers to manipulate earnings in attempt to 
influence short term stock price performance. 
Academic research reviewed by Healy and Wahlen (1999) documented that at least 
some firms attempt to influence short-term stock price performance by managing earnings. 
The evidence is consistent with firms managing earnings in periods surrounding capital 
market transactions and when there is a gap between firm's performance and analysts' or 
investor's expectations. However, there is little evidence on the frequency of the practice, and 
about the effect on resource allocation. Additionally, it is also unknown which accruals are 
used to manipulate earnings. 
 
3.2 Contracting motivations 
 
The financial statements are widely used to assess management compensation and to 
regulate lending contracts. Since the accounting data are used to monitor and regulate the 
contracts between the firm and its stakeholders, it is possible to assume that there are 
incentives for earnings management.  
In short, academic research findings suggest that compensation and lending contracts 
induce at least some firms to manage earnings to: a) increase bonus awards; b) improve job 
security; and c) mitigate potential violation of debt covenants. However, there is little 
evidence of whether this behavior is widespread or infrequent, no evidence of which specific 
accruals are most likely being used to manage earnings and no evidence of its effect on 
resource allocation. 
 
3.3 Regulatory motivations 
 
Virtually all industries are regulated to some degree. For example, in the U.S., banking 
and insurance industries are required to meet certain financial health criteria. Utilities have 
historically been rate-regulated to earn profits consistent with its business risks. Clearly, the 
need to comply with such regulations can trigger accounting manipulation. In addition, firms 
undergoing an anti-trust investigation and firms seeking a government subsidy or protection 
may have incentives to manage earnings to appear less profitable. The earnings management 
literature has covered the effects of two forms of regulation: a) industry specific; and b) anti-
trust. 
Healy and Whalen (1999) cited that the literature on earnings management strongly 
suggests that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. However, there is 
little evidence of whether this behavior is widespread, and no evidence of the effect on 
resource allocation.  
 
4 TESTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED EARNINGS 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) also noted that some recent studies adopted a new approach 
to document earnings management. These studies examined the distribution of reported 
earnings to assess whether there is evidence of earnings management. The studies assumed 
that managers have incentives to avoid reporting losses or reporting declines in earnings, and 
examined the distribution of reported earnings around these benchmarks. The findings 
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strongly suggest that some firms engage in earnings management when they anticipate: a) 
reporting a loss; b) reporting an earnings decline; or c) falling short on investors' expectations.  
Although Healy and Wahlen (1999) asserted that there is not enough evidence to 
determine which accruals or accounting methods have been most frequently used for 
managing earnings, Levitt (1998) pointed out the 5 most popular mechanisms that firms are 
using to manage earnings:2 
a) big bath restructuring charges; 
b) creative acquisition accounting and purchased R&D; 
c) miscellaneous cookie jar reserves; 
d) intentional errors deemed to be immaterial and intentional bias in estimates; and 
e) premature or aggressive revenue recognition. 
Moreover, Sherman and Young (2001) noted that recent history has shown that 
businesses with the following characteristics are more likely to feature manipulation of 
accounts: 
a) high growth company entering a low growth phase; 
b) companies that receive extensive coverage in the business and popular press; 
c) new businesses where there are ambiguities about how key transactions are and 
should be measured; 
d) weak control environments in which managers can manipulate reported financial 
results with relative impunity; 
e) companies that are followed by a small number of analysts; and 
f) companies with complex ownership and financial structures. 
The majority of the academic studies usually examine large samples of firms to 
document earnings management. The research methodology adopted in these studies relies 
upon statistical measures to identify earnings management. As result, these studies often 
present general conclusions about earnings management and their tests are often not powerful 
enough to identify managers of specific firms that managed earnings.  
In this paper, contrary to the bulk of academic research, we examine the occurrence of 
earnings management within one given firm. We chose to study Lucent Technologies because 
we knew that the company: a) restated earnings for the fiscal years of 1998, 1999, and 2000; 
b) was under investigation by the SEC; and c) was subject to a number of articles in the 
financial press that suggested that the managers manipulated earnings.  
To perform our analyses, we first searched for information about Lucent in the 
financial press and then looked for possible incentives and evidence of earnings management 
in the financial statements consistent with the practices described or suggested in the articles 
reviewed. We find this alternative approach to document earnings management useful to 
market participants, regulators, academics and students, because in addition to showing the 
innovations of creative accounting, it also illustrates the "mechanics" of earnings 
management. 
In the next section we present our analyses. First, we briefly describe the company 
and, then, identify possible incentives for earnings management and look for possible 
earnings manipulation consistent with these incentives. 
 
5 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES' FINANCIAL 
REPORTS 
 
5.1 Company background and business summary  
 
Lucent Technologies (www.lucent.com) was formed in 1996 as an AT&T spin-off. 
Essentially, the firm designs and delivers networks for the world's largest communications 
Felipe Faissol Janot de Matos – Moacir Sancovschi 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337, Blumenau, v. 1, n. 1, p 101 – 111, jan./abr. 2005. 
106 
service providers. Lucent's main business segments are: research and development, mobility, 
optical, data and voice networking systems, and software development. 
Lucent's competitors vary widely among the company’s various product and 
businesses categories. Its main competitors are: JDS-Uniphase, Pirelli, Fujitsu, Motorolla, 
Texas Instruments, Nortel, Cisco and Alcatel. Most of Lucent's clients are high tech and 
telecom firms. During the high tech golden years (from 1997 to 1999), Lucent was the largest 
manufacturer of telecom equipment and one of the most prominent corporations in the U.S.  
 
5.2 Evidence of earnings management 
 
In this section we identify some evidence that suggests that Lucent managed earnings. 
Yet, we first highlight the major incentives that could have possibly motivated earnings 
management. 
 
5.2.1 Possible Incentives 
 
a) Stock market motivations 
 
During its growth phase (from 1996 to 1999), Lucent's major incentive was to keep on 
reporting earnings and revenues above market expectation, to increase market capitalization 
(benefit from the premium that the investment community awards continuous high 
performance companies) (BARTH; ELLIOT; FINN, 1999). 
As virtually all companies, also Lucent has strong incentives to smooth earnings to 
appear less volatile. 
 
b) Contract motivations 
 
Inflating earnings to boost management compensation is a strong incentive. According 
to the information displayed in the proxy statement for year 2002, all of the top managers and 
most of the directors have performance pay plans based upon accounting measures such as 
earnings and revenues. 
Enhancing job security can also be considered an incentive to manage earnings to 
make the firm appear more profitable. 
Reducing the cost of capital can be considered a major incentive. Because of its 
aggressive growth strategy, Lucent was constantly issuing debt to acquire firms. Therefore, 
the company has incentives to present strong, healthy, and steady financial statements to 
reduce the cost of debt. 
 
5.2.2 Earnings management 
 
a) Miscellaneous cookie jar reserves and big bath restructuring charges 
 
Recent history has proven that investors panic when reported earnings fall below 
expectations and reward firms that consistently report earnings that are above expectations. In 
a technologically dynamic and fast growing industry such as the telecom, one might expect 
earnings to be highly volatile. However, for Lucent they were not. 
It has become a common practice among managers to take excessive restructuring 
charges (GAAP requires companies to estimate the future costs they expect to incur to carry 
out the restructuring plan) to clean up their balance sheet, giving the company a big bath. 
Popular belief says that investors will look beyond a one time loss and focus only on future 
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earnings.3 In addition, it is not unusual practice to reverse the overly conservative reserves to 
smooth out earnings whenever the company needs some extra revenue to meet certain 
accounting numbers (these reserves are also known as cookie jar reserves). The combination 
of the big bath with the cookie jar reserves is a convenient income smoothing device. 
At the time of its spin off, Lucent set up a $2,801 billion reserve to cover future costs 
of restructuring its operations. As it turned out, Lucent overestimated these future costs. Over 
the following 4 years, the company reversed more than $500 million to pretax income, 
increasing and smoothing out what would otherwise have been a more volatile earnings. 
It seems that at the spin off, Lucent took a big bath and expensed $2,801 billion. In the 
subsequent years, managers reversed part of the charge and enhanced revenue to smooth out 
earnings and to help to keep on reporting a pattern of constant revenue and earnings growth.  
 
b) In process research and development (IPRD) write-off 
 
In the last decade, there were many consolidations, acquisitions and spin-offs. GAAP 
allows firms to use discretion in accounting for acquisitions. In a purchase transaction, the 
acquiring company records the current market value of the purchased firm. The gap between 
the purchase price and the value of the purchased assets is called ‘goodwill’. Goodwill 
represents the value of the target to the acquiring firm, above the fair market value of all 
assets that can be identified. According to GAAP, firms must amortize goodwill over time. 
This amortization reduces future earnings and managers rarely like them. 
For high tech firms, where the bulk of the assets are intangibles that cannot be 
identified, a significant part of the purchase price can be goodwill. When a firm invests in a 
tangible asset, the cost is charged against the revenue over the asset's useful life. But for many 
intangible assets, because of the high uncertainty of future revenue associated with their 
useful life, GAAP requires firms to expense them. In an acquisition, the acquirer can include 
in the purchase price its own estimate of the future value of R&D in the target company. In 
this way, it is possible to reduce the goodwill and the associated amortization charges on 
future earnings.4 
Over its existence, Lucent has acquired 40 companies. Naturally, one might suspect 
that a possible area for earnings management is in-process research and development 
(IPR&D) write-off. Katz (2000) noted that Lucent has avoided $2.5 billion in goodwill and 
the associated drag on earnings since 1996. Although her analyzes does not provide 
irrefutable evidence of earnings management with IPR&D write-off, she suggested that 
Lucent conservatively expensed IPR&D to avoid large future amortization charges of 
goodwill. 
 
c) Premature or aggressive revenue recognition 
 
The most widely earnings management practice is premature or aggressive revenue 
recognition. In other words, managers recognize revenues before they have been earned or 
become realized.5 
In 1999, in order to keep up with revenue and earnings growth as well as with the 
competition, Lucent adopted an aggressive market strategy. The firm decided to finance 
customers to buy its equipment and to offer substantial discounts for anticipated purchases.  
By early 2000, even though many of its clients were signaling financial trouble, 
Lucent, possibly pressured to meet the numbers, offered significant discounts on purchases on 
account, continued to offer new loans to troubled companies, and expanded credit to client 
companies. Although such aggressive strategies can substantially increase current sales, the 
extra revenue is often generated at the expense of future sales at list price. These strategies 
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can constitute normal and legitimate business practices, but they can also be misleading to 
investors reading the financial reports, especially if managers engage in these transactions 
specifically to meet financial targets at the very end of the accounting period and chose not to 
fully disclose the details of the deal in the footnotes.6 
The increase of the Accounts Receivables (A/R) to Revenues ratio suggests that the 
company has been aggressively booking revenues. It can be seen from the company’s 
financial statements that the ratio increased by more than 50% from 1998 to 2000. This 















Exhibit 1 - Net Income vs. Cash Flow from Operations 
 
Exhibit 1 provides additional support of aggressive revenue recognition. One can 
observe that in years 1998 and 1999 the cash flow from operations was significantly lower 
than the net income. This disparity is mainly due to the large increase in accounts receivables 
($2.161 and $3.183 billion dollars for years 1998 and 1999 respectively). 
 
6 CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
Financial statements are to convey managers' information about their companies' 
performance to users of financial information. GAAP guide managers and allow them to 
exercise judgment in preparing the financial reports. In the GAAP, managers are permitted to 
use their best knowledge about their business to enhance the value of the report. However, 
this flexibility also leaves room for opportunistic behavior. 
There are many ways that managers can use judgment to influence reported 
accounting numbers. When such influence is directed at choosing reporting methods and 
estimates that do not accurately reflect their firm's underlying economics, it is also known as 
earnings management. Earnings management is not new. Levitt (1998) asserted that earnings 
management has evolved over the years. Recent accounting scandals proved that he was right. 
The massive market pressure on managers to meet Wall Street's expectations seems to be 
overriding business ethics; this raises serious concerns about the quality of earnings and the 
quality of financial reporting. 
As virtually all firms, also Lucent has strong incentives to manipulate earnings. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the managers have incentives to smooth out earnings and 
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report increasing revenues and earnings to: 1) enhance the firm's market capitalization; 2) 
increase management compensation and job security; and 3) reduce the cost of capital. It 
seems clear that Lucent used GAAP's flexibility to manage earnings. The earnings 
management evidence found was consistent with the incentives. The most prominent evidence 
suggests that the firm used: 1) big bath restructuring charges; 2) miscellaneous cookie jar 
reserves; 3) premature and aggressive revenue recognition; and 4) creative acquisition 
accounting and purchased R&D to manage earnings.  
The responsible authorities seem to be concerned with the consequences that earnings 
management can bring to the economy. On July 22, 2002, after the recent accounting 
scandals, Business Week published several government reform proposals that were likely to 
come true. They are: a) an independent accounting board; b) a more muscular SEC; c) 
CEO/CFO certification; d) shareholder approval on stock options award; e) auditor 
independence; f) more outside directors; and g) a curb on insider sales of stocks.  
In addition to these reforms, we believe it would also be helpful to: a) make companies 
expense stock options; b) impose harsher penalties for earnings management; and c) motivate 
companies to provide more accounting training and continued education for its managers. 
Moreover, we also agree with Bruns and Merchant’s (1990) argument about managing the 
corporate culture to reduce earnings management. According to them, a culture that promotes 
openness and cooperative problem solving among managers is likely to result in less short-
term earnings management than one that is more competitive and where annual and even 
quarterly performance shortfalls are punished. A corporate culture that is more concerned 
with managing for excellence rather than for reporting short-term profits will be less likely to 
induce the widespread use of immoral earnings management practices. 
And last but not least, it is also important to implement internal control systems 
capable of preventing opportunistic earnings management through operating decisions taken 





1 Parfet (2000), who is on the corporate side, argues that there are good and bad types of 
earnings management. According to him, the bad earnings management, which comprises 
improper earnings management, is intervening to hide real operating performance by creating 
artificial accounting entries or stretching estimates beyond a point of reasonableness. The 
good kind of earnings management comprises reasonable and proper practices that are part of 
operating a well managed business and delivering value to shareholders. According to him, 
taking such actions as selling assets when revenues are at low or awarding special discounts to 
advance sales at the end of quarters are all legitimate ways to try to create stable financial 
performance, by acceptable voluntary business decisions. 
 
2 Revsine, Collins, and Johnson (2002) pages 115-117 provide further details on these 
mechanisms.  
 
3 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) also provides additional support that there are significant 
positive reactions to restructuring charges, consistent with the view that these announcements 
signal information about expected future performance. 
 
4 Note that nowadays under the SFAS 142, implemented at the end of year 2001, goodwill 
must be tested for impairment rather than amortized up to a 40 year period. 
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5 The SEC asserts that revenue is earned (critical event) and is realized or realizable 
(measurability)-and, therefore, can be recognized - when all of the following criteria are met: 
a) persuasive evidence of an exchange arrangement exists; b) delivery has occurred or 
services have been rendered; c) the seller's price to the buyer is fixed or determinable; and d) 
collectability is reasonably assured (REVSINE; COLLINS; JOHNSON, 2001). 
 
6 With the benefit of hindsight, one can observe that this aggressive sales strategy turned out 
to be costly to the firm. The company lost close to 679 million in bad debt/sales return and 
decided to restate earnings due to improper revenue recognition. As a result, market value of 
the company dropped by $10.9 billion in 2000. In late November 2002, Lucent's CEO 
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